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Introduction
1 Traditionally employment relations are regulated by collective labour agreements. In the
Netherlands, like in many Western countries, collective agreements are used to regulate
the rights and obligations of the employer and the employee on topics such as contracts,
working  hours  and  wages.  Collective  labour  agreements  are  usually  the  result  of
collective bargaining between unions and (groups of) employers and are legally binding
for all employees working in a company or a specific sector. We are currently observing a
fundamental  change  in  the  management  of  the  employment  relationship.  In  the
Netherlands, as well as in other Western countries, the traditional collectively bargained
employment  relation  is  being  slowly  replaced  by  what  we  call  individuallynegotiated
employment relations. In individually negotiated employment relations, employees make,
within limits, personalized agreements with their supervisors about when and how long
they work, how much they will be paid, what their career prospects will be, what specific
performance goals will be set, et cetera. This observation about changing employment
relations is in line with several  recent theories and research articles on employment
relations  (Blyton & Turnbull,  1994;  Brown et  al. 1998,  2001;  De  Leede,  Looise  & Van
Riemsdijk,  2004,  Huiskamp, 2004;  Huiskamp, De Leede,  & Looise 2002;  Marchington &
Parker, 1990; Oeij, 2006; Oeij et al, 2006; Traxler, 1995).
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2 Traxler  (1995)  already  noticed  in  the  mid-nineties  a  broad  European  trend  towards
decentralisation of industrial  relations.  He made a distinction between organized and
disorganized decentralisation. Organized decentralization of industrial relations means
that  the  collective  agreement  concluded at  the national  or  industrial  level  delegates
certain bargaining issues to regulation at a lower level. This is done within the binding
framework set by the focal collective agreement. As the Netherlands may be seen as a
typical example of organized decentralisation (De Leede, Looise & Van Riemsdijk, 2004,
Huiskamp, 2004) it is useful to explore this process at company level. Which bargaining
issues  are  ‘left’  to  the  company  level,  and  even  more  importantly,  to  the  dyadic
relationship between supervisor and employee?
3 The UK may be seen as an example of disorganized decentralisation. Brown et al. (1998,
2001)  examined  employment  relationships  in  13  unionised  and  13  non-unionised
companies in the UK. In both types of companies, he found evidence that the bilateral
determination of employment terms in a collective agreement is replaced by unilateral
decision taking by the employer. Instead of collective bargaining, employees are offered
individual employment contracts only. However, these are not negotiated on an individual,
equal-power basis. On the contrary, the employee does not have much of a say. To the
extent that employment relations have become more flexible (for example annual rather
than weekly working hours), this flexibility is used in the interest of the employer rather
than fitting employment relations to specific needs and demands of employees (cf. Gallie
et al, 1998). 
4 In the Netherlands the growth of individually negotiated employment relations has been
witnessed by Huiskamp, De Leede, & Looise (2002),  who conducted 11 case studies in
Dutch  companies  and  signalled  the  emergence  of  so-called  third  contracts between
employers and employees. The third contract exists in addition to, firstly, the individual
employment contract employees sign at the start of their employment, and secondly, to
collective agreements between unions and (groups of) employers. Third contracts are the
result of an interaction process between supervisor and employee in which they discuss
or negotiate about aspects of the employment relation and finally come to an agreement
about  performance  goals,  wage,  working  hours,  development,  et  cetera.  These  third
contracts (De Leede et al, 2004) are updated according to the changing situation of the
company  and  the  preferences  of  individual  employees.  Gründemann  et  al. (2005)
performed a survey among 500 Dutch employers and 1000 employees. A a majority of
employers (60.7%) claimed that individual negotiations about the employment relation
take  place.  Furthermore,  a  majority  of  the  employers  (62.6%)  find  it  desirable  that
employees will negotiate more about their employment relation in the future. Among
employees (N=1000), findings are not quite the same. A minority of the employees (41.7%)
say that they have the opportunity to negotiate their employment relation with their
supervisor. Much more employees, 79.4%, find it desirable to negotiate their employment
relation more in the near future. The overall conclusion is that employers perceive more
often than employees  that  negotiations  do  take  place,  and that  both employers  and
employees believe that negotiating the employment relation is a desirable development,
although employees find it even more desirable than employers. 
5 In sum, from the 1990s onwards, we can single out decentralisation and individualisation
as  the  main  components  of  a  change  to  ‘modern’  employment  relations.  This
development is  also reflected by the change in conceptualisation of  the employment
relation in the international literature. The concept of the employment relationship (or
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employment  relations)  is  replacing  the  concept  of  industrial  relations  (see  Blyton &
Turnbull,  1994;  Marchington & Parker,  1990,  Huiskamp,  2004).  Rousseau (2001,  2005)
paints  a  similar  picture  of  employers  in  many  countries  making  more  and  more
‘idiosyncratic  deals’  or  ‘I-deals’  with  their  employees,  in  which they  negotiate  at  an
individual level about aspects such as work/family balance and the worker’s stake in the
company.
6 Our main proposition is that employees are more and more discussing and negotiating on
a  direct  and  individual  level  with  their  supervisor,  which  results  in  tailor-made
agreements  on  additions  to  the  contract (e.g.  for  instance  a  telework  contract  of
contractual changes in annual hours), working hours (e.g. specific schedules, leave), wages 
(e.g. wage increase or salary structure), development (e.g. individual development plan)
and performance goals (e.g. tasks and targets). Moreover, we argue that this increase of
individually negotiated employment relations can be partly explained by changes taking
place in higher-level rules and regulations. We propose that these rules and regulations,
such as labour law,  collective agreements and rules set  by management systems,  are
becoming less  and less  ‘strict’.  Instead,  they leave scope for  actors  at  lower levels  to
negotiate the employment relationship. However, we do not suppose that the actual use
equals the possible scope for negotiation. In addition, we expect several advantages and
disadvantages  of  individualised  employment  relations.  Sparrow & Cooper  (2003)  and
Pfeffer (2001) point to the danger of unfairness in focusing only on the top 10 percent of
the workforce, while the other 90% also are valuable for the company. 
7 To sum up, our research questions are:
• what issues of the employment relationship can be individually negotiated in organizations
(in other words: what is the possible scope for employees and their supervisor for
negotiating their employment relation)?
• what issues of the employment relationship are individually negotiated in organizations (in
other words, what is the actual use of the scope for employees and supervisor)?
• what is the degree of correspondence between scope and its actual use?
8 We  will  answer  these  research  questions  by  means  of  four  case  studies  in  Dutch
companies. In the discussion section, we will work out several propositions that explain
our findings and are worth testing in future research.
 
Method 
9 In our study we focus on five topics for negotiation in the employment relationship:
contracts,  working  hours,  wages,  development  and performance  goals.  An important
concept in our research is scope, the room to manoeuvre for individual employees and
their supervisors to negotiate their employment relation. Three sources determine the
scope. First, the rules contained in labour law. Second, the rules and procedures set by
the collective agreements. Third, the organisational rules embedded in the company’s
management system. The first source, i.e. labour law, was excluded in our study, because
we  chose  to  focus  on  nearby-determinants  of  scope;  in  addition,  labour  law cannot
explain differences because it is the same for each company. 
10 To answer the first question on the possible scope, we examined the possibility individual
employees and their supervisors have for negotiating the employment relationship, by
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studying collective agreements as well as internal HR-rulebooks. We distinguish between
three types of rules in collective bargaining:
• Standard rules: these are the classic substance of collective agreements. They are applied in
a standard way across the board. The outcome is by and large predetermined. 
• Framework rules: these leave room for differentiation of rules between groups of employees,
between organizational units/departments and between individuals. They are often open
ended procedural rules, in the sense that the outcome is not or only partly predetermined.
• À la carte rules: these are a particular variant of framework rules. They provide individual
choice for predefined options in exchanging ‘money’ and ‘time’ within a given framework:
more or less holidays, more or less working hours, flexible pension (early/part time
retirement), sabbatical leave, leave for training. Employees can put together - on a voluntary
and yearly basis - their own package of employment terms and conditions in terms of wages,
number of working hours, number of holidays, extra (long term) leave, training and
pensions (cf. Delsen et al, 2006).
11 The  second  question  on  the  actual  use  has  been  investigated  by  interviewing  our
respondents in the cases. We asked our respondents on the extent to which employees
and managers make use of the possible scope for individual negotiation. 
12 The  third  question  (concerning  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  negotiated
employment relations as perceived by employees and managers) is answered by using our
qualitative  data.  During  the  interviews  we  asked  for  the  pro’s  and  con’s  in  a  semi-
structured way, leaving enough room to add specific issues by our respondents.
13 A total of four case studies in Dutch organizations were conducted, featuring a telecom
company, a health insurance company, a metalworking factory and a consultancy group.
Telecom and Insurance are large companies that allowed us to distinguish them from the
small  companies:  Metalworking  and  Consultancy.  Consultancy  is  special  for  a
fundamental reason because the consultants are self-employed. As such for them there is
no employment relation to regulate in the classic sense; they conclude self-employment
contracts with the company. 
14 We aimed at interviewing a variety of stakeholders in these organizations, ranging from
higher managers to shop floor employees,  including HR-managers and works council
members if applicable. As the size of the four organizations differed considerably, we did
not interview the same number of people in all companies. We conducted 34 interviews in
the telecom company, 17 in the insurance company, 10 in the metalworking factory and 8
in the consultancy group. The length of the interviews was at least one hour each. As a
part  of  each  case  study,  we  analysed  available  and  relevant  documents,  including
collective agreements, policy papers, personnel manuals, labour contracts, performance
review sheets and development schemes. 
 
Results
15 In the results section, we will answer our three research questions respectively using data
from the four case studies (Goudswaard et al, 2005). 
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What is the scope for negotiation?
16 Collective  bargaining  and  collective  labour  agreements  are  meant  to  regulate  the
employment  relationship.  In  Telecom,  Insurance  and  Metalworking  collective  labour
agreements apply. Telecom has a company agreement and Insurance and Metalworking
are covered by industry agreements. Consultancy has no collective labour agreement. 
 
Table 1- Framework and a la carte rules in Telecom, Insurance and Metalworking
 Telecom Insurance Metalworking Consultancy
contract - output contract 
- telework contract
- annualised
working hours in
bandwidth 32-40
hours
- telework contract
 n.a.
working 
hours
- extra/less working
hours
- schedules
- several long term
leave arrangements
(above labour law)
- overtime (time for
time)
- schedules
- reduced working
hours for seniors
- annualised
overtime
- schedules
- overtime (time
for time)
n.a.
wages - pay for
performance (only
for sales employees)
- assessment based
wage increases
- extra/less wages
- extra pension
- assessment based
wage increases
- assessment
based wage
increases
n.a.
development - individual training
plan 
- individual training
budget
- extra leave for
training
- individual
development plan
 n.a.
performance
indicators
none none none n.a.
17 In  Telecom  there  are  a  considerably  number  of  framework  rules  for  instance  on
negotiating  supplementary  output  or  telework  contracts,  schedules  and  individual
training plans and budgets. There is an à la carte system in place, with options for more
or less wages, more or less working hours, options for extra long-term leave and extra
pension. Insurance has many options for working hours as employees can choose yearly
their numbers of working hours within a bandwidth of an average of 32-40 hours per
week, shorten their working week at a certain age or negotiate schedules (for instance
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the popular schedule of four days of 8.5 hours in a 34 hours week). The à la carte system
of the industry agreement for health insurance has not as yet been agreed upon in this
company with the works council and is as yet not operational. In Metalworking there is
only limited scope for negotiating the employment relation.
18 The subject of performance goals is addressed in none of the agreements, neither in a
substantive nor in a procedural way. There are assessment procedures and assessment
based wage systems in which performance targets play a crucial role, but the actual level
of these targets is at best only subject of informal or local understandings. This is not
surprising as  levels  of  performance are subject  to the age-old adage of  ‘the right  to
manage’. Hence, management has the prerogative to decide and change if necessary how
their employees contribute to the organizations goals, what their tasks are like and what
targets are set for them. 
19 Telecom, Insurance and to a lesser extent Metalworking all have agreements that are
fairly typical of the changes in collective bargaining, i.e. new types of framework and à la
carte agreements that have been developed over the past 10 years in the Netherlands
(Huiskamp,  2004).  Framework and à la  carte rules  provide procedures for  negotiated
employment  relations.  For  some  subjects,  agreement  with  the  supervisor  is  a
precondition whereas for other subjects,  individuals have a free choice. This depends
largely  on  the  consequences  for  operational  processes.  For  instance,  if  an  employee
expresses a preference for more working hours, the supervisor has to adequately assess
the workload and staffing levels for the next period. Will there be work available or is
there a danger of overstaffing ? Table 2 shows some examples of these procedures. 
 
Table 2 Examples of procedures for reaching agreements within framework rules (including a la
carte rules) 
Individual preferences to be discussed
with supervisor
Individual preferences to be registered 
through HR department
more or less working hours
schedules
output contract 
telework
sabbatical leave
pension
extra leave ( a la carte)
early retirement
overtime (compensation in money or time for time)
20 An  example  of  an  individual  choice  to  be  registered  through  HR  is  an  employee’s
preference to pay part of his bonus in his pension scheme. The supervisor has no role in
decisions  of  this  type,  because  it  does  not  affect  primary  work  processes.  Another
example is the employee’s option for overtime : to be paid the overtime rate or to be
compensated ‘time for time’. However, if the employee chooses ‘time for time’, he will
have to discuss with his supervisor the scheduling of the extra time off. The supervisor
may press the employee not to opt for ‘time for time’ compensation if the department is
very busy and the supervisor wants to avoid the difficulty of  changing the schedule.
Telework is a clear example of a matter to be discussed with the supervisor : does the
employee’s job content allow working at home, can they agree on performance goals for
the  amount  of  work  done  away from direct  supervision,  what  are  the  costs  for  the
employee’s office at home ? Obviously, in such matters the HR department will also be
involved.
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21 The scope for negotiation between the employee and the supervisor is to a large extent
determined by bilateral regulation as expressed in the framework and a la carte rules.
However, in addition the scope of the supervisor for negotiating the employment relation
is also determined by the company’s management system. On some issues supervisors
can,  within  a  given  framework,  decide  autonomously.  On  other  issues,  they  need
authorisation from higher management and/or HR management. There can also be topics
on which the supervisor has no decision-making powers. In Table 3 we present the degree
of decision-making powers of supervisors as we observed them in our case studies. 
 
Table 3 : Degree of decision-making power of supervisors in the four cases
 Telecom Insurance Metalworking Consultancy
Autonomous decision-
making of supervisors
- working
hours
- development
- working
hours
- development
  
Supervisor proposes
but needs authorisation
- contract
- wages
- contract
- wages
- working hours
- development
 
Supervisor has no
power
- performance
goals
- performance
goals
- performance
goals
- contract
- wages
- contract
- working
hours
- wages
- development
- performance
goals
22 As Table 3 shows in Telecom and Insurance supervisors may decide autonomously on
working hours and development. For instance the supervisor decides on allocating the
training budget among his staff, although HR acts in the role of controller of the budget
and its allocation. There are also some aspects of working hours that need authorisation
from HR (for instance a new variant in the scheduling of the working week). Supervisors
need authorisation by HR as to whether their employees opt for an output contract or
telework. Higher management was not involved in these decisions. Supervisors have no
power on collectively agreed wage increases across the board, but they do play a crucial
role in the assessment based wage increases. Both higher line management and HR have
to authorise final proposals. Higher line management sets performance goals top down in
routine production processes, while supervisors have a role in proposing performance
goals in non-routine processes. In non-routine processes performance is more difficult to
measure  and  there  are  (as  yet)  less  standardized  procedures.  In  Metalworking  the
supervisors have no autonomous decision-making powers on contract and wages and
even  though  supervisors  can  negotiate  arrangements  for  working  hours,  they  need
authorization  by  higher  management.  The  director  decides  on  the  wage  increase,
predominantly basing his decision on the assessment of the supervisor. The supervisor in
the metal working company does not control the development budget and needs ad hoc
authorization  for  most  development  expenses.  We  observed  again  that  higher  line
management sets performance goals top down. In Consultancy the contract of the self-
employed consultants is highly standardised and the supervisor ( =director) has no power
to  negotiate  this  contract  (only  the  Board does,  but  this  is  highly  exceptional).  The
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director has no say over the numbers of hours self-employed consultants put in. They
work as many hours as they wish varying from 60 to 27 hours a week, with two working
days as an implicit minimum; therefore the income of consultants is largely depended on
their turnover and billable hours. The director has no say over development as it is up to
the  individual  consultants,  although  there  are  in-company  meetings  for  sharing
experiences and gaining new knowledge.  The consultants  set  their  own performance
goals.
23 In sum,  in Telecom,  Insurance and Metalworking we observed in both the collective
agreement and the management system considerable scope of supervisors for working
hours and limited scope for performance goals and wages. For contracts and development
we  observed  considerable  scope  in  Telecom  and  Insurance,  but  limited  scope  in
Metalworking. In Consultancy with the self-employed consultants,  the supervisor (the
director) has little to no authority on all these issues as he has no hierarchical position
towards the consultants. 
 
What issues are actually negotiated ?
24 In order to answer our second research question, the extent to which employees actually
use  the  scope  to  individually  negotiate  the  employment  relationship  and  reach
agreements on specific aspects of the employment relation, we asked our respondents in
the four case companies a number of questions about these matters. 
 
Telecom
25 In this case we distinguished between sales employees and operators. We expected the
first category to negotiate their employment relation to a larger degree than the second,
because of differences in job autonomy and relations with clients. 
26 With regard to working hours, both sales employees and operators state that they can
determine their own working hours to a certain extent. For instance an employee was
relocated to another department far from home involving a much larger commuting
distance. He had been able to negotiate the length of his working day, seven instead of
eight hours, with his manager. So one working hour was used as commuting time. 
27 With regard to development, again the majority of respondents of both groups negotiate.
‘There are many opportunities, particularly when employees themselves take the initiative’, said
several  respondents.  In  general,  respondents  were  quite  positive  about  educational
opportunities.  Ample  budgets  for  education are  available  to  all  employees.  However,
there are some restraints. Respondents say that much of the training and education is
job-specific and obligatory rather than following from negotiations with one’s supervisor.
Moreover,  many  respondents  say  that  recent  cost  cuttings  have  had  an  impact  on
development opportunities. They say that employees at this moment in time are only
allowed to follow courses that are directly beneficiary for the organization. 
28 Although there is ample opportunity to negotiate working hours and development, the
other  three  topics  were  much  less  negotiated.  With  regard  to  contract,  almost  all
respondents  say  that  when  entering  the  organization,  they  are  offered  a  standard
employment contract based on the collective agreement. However, employees above a
certain  pay  level  can  opt  for  a  so-called  ‘output  contract’.  In  an  output  contract,
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employees are paid for fulfilling their performance targets rather than for working the
standard number of hours. In exchange for having fewer days off they receive 8.5 % more
pay. Nevertheless, many employees do not perceive to have any choice for either the
output  contract  or  a  standard  contract  with  fixed  working  hours.  Regardless  of  the
contract, they feel obliged to reach their targets, whether this will take them long hours
or not. 
29 Wages are hardly negotiated. The rules laid down in collective agreements are strictly
adhered to.  Wage increases for employees are partly based on a general,  collectively
agreed pay rise and partly on the basis of an assessment of their development on selected
competences (only sales employees receive pay-for-performance in a individual scheme).
In  today’s  difficult  economic  situation,  managers  follow  the  rules  of  the  collective
agreement even more strictly than before. 
30 Finally, not much negotiation on performance goals is taking place, according to most
respondents. Employees in higher-level jobs (requiring a college degree) negotiate more
often about performance goals than employees in lower level jobs. Although employees
and supervisors have opportunities for discussing performance goals – in some instances
even four times a year – there is not much negotiation on this subject : ‘No negotiation is
possible about performance with one’s supervisor’, says a respondent. Performance goals are
very often imposed top-down and expressed in quantitative indicators. 
31 In sum, we conclude that in Telecom working hours and development are negotiated, but
contract, wage and performance goals hardly at all. In contrast to our expectation, sales
employees  appeared  to  negotiate  hardly  more  than  operators  with  the  exception  of
performance goals  because of  the greater  ambiguities  in and obstacles  to fulfil  their
targets.
 
Insurance 
32 In this case we distinguished between employees and managers working at non-routine
customer  service  departments  versus  employees  and  managers  working  at  routine
clerical departments. 
33 Respondents at the customer service department negotiate working hours slightly more
than respondents at the clerical department. They manage their own hours, as they spent
a lot of time at customers as well as on the road. Therefore, their supervisors do not have
much insight into their specific working hours. They reach individual agreements about
schedules,  overtime,  leave  and  holidays.  Some  respondents  for  instance  compensate
overtime with extra leave later on. Other employees see overtime as part of the job : ‘You
just do your job and if  you spend too many hours,  you apparently should have worked more
efficiently’, says an employee at customer service. At the clerical department employees
draft a schedule for their working hours and days off for the coming year in November.
They discuss this schedule with their supervisor and colleagues. Issues for discussion are :
the  workload  during  peak  periods,  the  coordination  of  holidays,  the  staffing  of  the
‘problematic’ Friday (many employees working 34 hours in a schedule 4 days of 8.5 hours
like to take Friday off). Recently senior management has laid down some strict rules for
both supervisors and employees concerning taking time off on Fridays and during peak
periods, limiting the scope for negotiation. 
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34 Some respondents negotiate their performance targets. Customer service jobs are rather
complex and performance is difficult to measure as there are no clear, specific output
standards. Instead supervisors and employees together draft a plan each year in which
they agree upon tasks and performance goals. This plan, based on last year performance
and next year targets,  can be seen as a kind of negotiating on performance goals.  In
clerical jobs, no negotiation takes place on performance targets at all.  Operations are
highly standardized in this department, which makes work highly routine without any
task  autonomy.  Standards  for  performance  are  clearly  defined  and  fixed  by  higher
management, for instance the number of expense accounts that must be processed each
week. So, employees in clerical jobs do not negotiate their performance goals because
these  goals  are  standardized  and  easy-to-measure,  whereas  employees  in  customer
service  have  more  leeway  to  negotiate  their  complex  and  difficult-to-measure
performance goals.
35 On the remaining three topics we studied, i.e. contract, wages and development, most
respondents say that negotiation hardly occurs. On contracts all employees have a yearly
option to adapt their annual working hours depending on their salary grade within a
bandwidth of either an average working week of 34-38 hours or 32-38 hours. At customer
service, employees say that the workload in their jobs is at such a high level, that working
less than 38 hours is not a realistic option. Therefore, they feel forced to choose the
highest possible number of working hours. At the clerical department employees prefer
the lowest possible number of 34 hours. This is possible because the workload is more
evenly spread than in customer service. 
36 There appears to be little scope for negotiating wages. Apart from the collectively agreed
wage increase, supervisors grant their employees assessment based increases that can
result in either no periodical wage increase, half a periodical, one periodical or a double
periodical. Almost all employees automatically receive one standard wage increase – one
periodical  -  each  year.  Wage  increases  are  thus  based  on  seniority  rather  than
performance  and  although  performance  is  evaluated  each  year,  this  has  little
consequences for  their  wages.  An exception has to be made for  junior  employees  at
customer service. In the years after their appointment it is possible to negotiate a more
senior job content and thereby proceed more quickly through the salary scales.
37 On the topic of development, there appears to be not much negotiation either. Although
employees at customer service draft their own personal development plans each year, in
practice these plans are of no great importance. ‘The content of personal development plans is
disappointing, questions like “what are your goals in five years time” aren’t asked that much’, says
an employee. As to employees in clerical jobs we observed that supervisors stimulate only
some of their employees to draft personal development plans, because they believe that
many of their low-educated employees are not interested in developing themselves at
work.  This is  confirmed by some of our respondents,  but others say their supervisor
refused to support their initiatives for development because their manager wanted them
to continue performing the tasks that they could perform already well and fast. 
38 In sum, we conclude that in the case Insurance, in particular working hours but also
wages and performance goals  to some extent are negotiated at  the customer service
department. We perceive substantive differences between customer service employees
and  clerical  employees.  These  latter  only  negotiate  working  hours  to  some  extent.
Development is hardly negotiable for both groups of employees. With regard to contracts,
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respondents in both groups did not change their options for the average working week on
a frequent basis.
 
Metal working
39 In  the  case  of  the  metal  working  company we particularly  expect  -  as  it  is  a  small
company - to see a more dominant role of the director in the negotiations. Because of the
small  number of  respondents in this case we have made no further departmental  or
functional distinctions in the presentation of the results. Both employees and managers
do perceive some possibilities to negotiate about working hours, development and (to a
very limited degree) wages. 
40 By far most employees at the factory work from 7 :30 am to 4 :00 pm, including half an
hour lunch break. Some employees work in two shifts with fixed schedules. Everybody is
expected  to  work  within  these  specific  time  frames.  In  a  small  number  of  cases
exceptional working hours are negotiated between employee and supervisor only when
there is a sense of urgency on the part of the employee (for instance working longer
hours in the summer and shorter hours in the winter due to seasonal driving conditions)
and if the resulting arrangement is mutually beneficiary (for instance a 4x9 schedule).
These agreements typically require the consent of the director. 
41 Somewhat to the frustration of the employees we interviewed, negotiation about wages
by and large does not take place. The reason is the combined effect of the standardized
wage structure prescribed in the collective agreement and the intricate structure of the
internal  performance  assessment  system.  In  addition,  it  is  the  director,  not  the
supervisor, who decides on the wage adjustment at the yearly assessment interview. This
decision normally leads to acceptance or only a short-lived discussion as the director
always has the last say. As a supervisor put it : ‘I’m only an operational manager, I can consult
and control, but I don’t decide’. An employee commented: ‘I can state my opinion, but they
follow  their  own  agenda  regardless  of  what  I  have  to  say’.  Latitude  for  employees  and
supervisors is limited to negotiating specific ad hoc benefits such as personal loans, a
mobile telephone or extra travel allowance. These agreements however also need the
approval of the director.  
42 As for the topic of development, some negotiation takes place between employee and
supervisor.  The supervisor  usually  suggests  a  training or  education schedule  for  the
employee,  but  the  employee  is  also  stimulated  to  make  suggestions.  If  considerable
investments are involved,  the arrangements have to be presented to the director for
approval. Neither supervisors nor employees perceive the agreements they make about
development as actual negotiations, but there is substantial latitude to come to mutually
beneficiary  development  schemes.  On  the  remaining  topics,  performance  goals  and
contracts, no significant negotiation occurs.
43 We  can  conclude  that  in  the  metal  working  company,  only  working  hours  and
development are to some extent negotiated. Additions to wages are only negotiated in
exceptional cases, and performance goals and contracts are not negotiated at all.  The
director plays an important role.
 
Negotiating Individual Employment Relations, Evidence from four Dutch Organiz...
Revue Interventions économiques, 35 | 2007
11
Consultancy 
44 The consultancy group is an uncommon case. The consultants are self-employed. They all
have their own company and sign a self-employed contract with the group. This contract
does not resemble an employment contract in any way. The core of the self-employed
contract refers to the cooperation between the consultant and the group, in particular in
two areas : the sharing of work and customers and their contribution to the exchange and
development of common values and products. These common values are based on certain
anthroposophist ideas of the founder of the group. The founder has written a series of
successful management books and is well known in the market for his specific approach. 
45 The present director is not a traditional supervisor, he spends only one day a week on his
directors duties. There are no formal controls vis a vis the consultants but he is tuned
into  what  is  happening  in  the  group  and  he  regularly  monitors  indicators  such  as
turnover  and  billable  hours.  The  consultant  is  responsible  for  the  maintenance  and
development of his own area of expertise, attracting his customers, his turnover and the
billable hours. The consultants may also share their customers and projects and work on
projects generated by the group. The group bills the customer and the consultant bills the
group. 
46 What  happens  to  negotiations on  contract,  working  hours,  wages,  development  and
performance targets in a situation like this ? There is neither a traditional employee nor a
traditional  supervisor.  The  self-employed  contract  is  a  standard  contract  and  not
individualized between consultant and the director (it can only be modified by the Board
of priority share holders). As for working time there is only an implicit understanding
that the minimum average working week is two days a week. In consequence turnover
and incomes (not wages) vary greatly with the number of hours consultants put in. There
are no explicit indicators for performance and performance is not regularly assessed. As
to development, training and following courses is the responsibility of the self-employed,
though there are joint meetings and sessions on values, products and improving training
skills.
47 The group is what one can call a network organization. The director and consultants are
experiencing the set-up as beyond the wage labour arrangement, as an emancipation of
its shackles. The consultants are also shareholders but they cannot be classified as owners
of the group (no priority share holders). The tax inspector in the first instance refused to
recognize the self-employed status of the consultants, in his opinion they were bogus self-
employed. Later he turned around and accepted their status.
48 As there is neither an employee nor a supervisor it is in this case better to refer to the
scope  and  use  for  self-regulation  instead  of  an  individually  negotiated  employment
relationship. Again, because of the small number of respondents in this case we have
made no further functional distinctions in the presentation of the results. 
49 The scope for individual self-regulation is potentially tremendous. There is no collective
labour agreement, no other collective arrangements such as a pension scheme ; there is
no hierarchical management system. The self-employed contract may be standard but it
regulates very little. The actual use of the scope is also large ; mainly because consultants
are free in the number of hours/days they work. Nevertheless, the group stays together
because of the shared values, its philosophy and common interest in sharing customers
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and projects. The lack of formal rules and management systems is thus compensated by a
shared belief system, which consultants internalise during their traineeship.
 
Correspondence of scope and actual negotiation
50 Up until this point, the answers to the first two research questions are treated as separate
domains,  whereas  they  are  evidently  linked.  Our  third  research  question  turns  the
attention  to  the  degree  of  correspondence  between  scope  and  actual  negotiation.
However,  if  one takes a closer look,  scope and actual use appear not to be linked as
expected beforehand. On some but not all topics of the employment relationship scope
corresponds with actual negotiation. Table 4 presents an overview of the correspondence
between scope and actual negotiation in our cases.
 
Table 4 Correspondence between scope and actual negotiation
  Telecom Insurance Metalworking Consultancy
high degree
of
correspondence
1. scope and actual
use considerable
-working hours
-development
-working hours
customer service
 -working
hours
-
development
-wages
2. scope and actual
use limited
-performance goals
sales employees
-performance goals 
customer service
-wages customer
service
-working
hours
-development
 
3. no scope and
no use
-wages
-performance goals
operators
-wages clerical
department
-performance goals
clerical department
-contract
-wages
-performance
goals
-contract
low degree of
correspondence 4. scope considerable
and actual use limited
-
contract
-working hours clerical
department
-contract
-development
 -performance
goals
5. scope limited
and actual use
considerable
    
51 Scope corresponds only with actual negotiation on working hours and wages. With regard
to working hours there is both considerable scope and actual negotiation. Hence, in at
least two case studies, because framework rules collective agreements and management
systems offer scope for negotiation,  these negotiations are indeed taking place.  With
regard to wages, there is little scope and hardly any negotiation. Again, the case studies
suggest that wages are strictly regulated in the standard rules of collective agreements,
employees and supervisors do not negotiate on this topic. 
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52 With regard to three other topics, there is no clear overlap between scope and actual
negotiation. In all cases, there is considerable scope for negotiating development, but only
in the telecom company actual negotiation occurs on a large scale. An explanation is that
in the telecom company, training budgets are actively used, not only to develop job-
specific skills but also to increase employability and stimulate people to explore career
opportunities outside the company. The health insurance company has recently decided
to limit budgets for training and development, and in the metal working factory most
respondents followed training only after the supervisor or the director suggested it to
them. 
53 With regard to performance goals, it appears that although scope is limited, employees and
supervisors do negotiate about targets, albeit in non-routine processes only. A possible
explanation for this result is that although higher management does set clear (financial)
targets, these targets must be translated into specific task-related goals by supervisors
and employees. In the case of routine processes this is relative easy because output is
easily  measurable.  Therefore,  there  is  no  need  and  no  opportunity  for  negotiating
performance goals. However, in non-routine processes, targets are more ambiguous and
less easy to measure. Moreover, employees in non-routine processes often have high-
level jobs with considerable task-autonomy. Both the ambiguity of output standards and
the autonomy of the job will provide opportunities for negotiating performance goals. 
54 Finally, with regard to contract, in the cases of the telecom and insurance company, there
appears to be considerable scope, but little actual negotiation. An explanation is that
contracts are only very infrequently negotiated, because employees only now and then
choose  to  change  it,  depending  on  substantial  shifts  in  personal  circumstances.
Therefore, supervisors and employees do not perceive much negotiation with regard to
contract.  In  the  case  of  the  metal  working  factory,  the  industry  agreement  hardly
provides any scope for negotiating contract, and no actual negotiation was taking place.
 
Discussion
55 Our qualitative data based on four cases show that the trend towards more individual
negotiations is still sketchy. Around some topics more negotiation occurs than others. In
this  discussion  section  we  indicate  some  important  issues,  arising  from  our  data.
Important issues both for practice and further theory development. 
56 The first issue is a contingency-related subject : given the variety of individualised labour
relations  what  are  the  relevant  factors  that  influence  the  prevalence  and  the
effectiveness of individual negotiations ? Our data suggest that the scale and contents of
negotiations can vary according to the nature of the collective agreement (standard and
framework rules), the type of organization (size and nature of the company) and type of
process/type  of  job  (routine  and  non-routine).  Beyond  a  certain  point  when  the
contractual  wage  labour  relation  is  substituted  for  a  self-employed  status  and  the
organisation evolves into a network organisation, negotiation seems to transform into
self  regulation.  Therefore,  more insight  is  needed in the conditions of  the scope for
negotiation or self regulation and its actual use. It might be an interesting continuum
from a traditional employment contract, an output contract to a self-employed contract.
This  is  close  to  Rousseau’s  (2005)  classification  of  standardized,  positional  and
idiosyncratic employment conditions. The optimal use of I-deals varies along with firm
characteristics  and  HR  practices ;  egalitarian  organizations  will  downplay  status
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differences that come along with individual negotiations.  Our case-studies suggest an
extra possibility : the self-employed contract. 
57 The second issue is the negotiation process itself. In our study, we did not look at the way
in which these negotiations take place.  The negotiation literature (e.g.  Fisher,  Ury,  &
Patton,  1991 ;  Lax  &  Sebenius,  1986 ;  Rubin,  Pruitt,  &  Kim,  1994)  shows  that  people
demonstrate  different  negotiation  behaviour.  Individuals  can  opt  for  integrative
behaviour, in which parties try to ‘enlarge the pie’ (win-win-solutions). Another option is
a distributive style of negotiation, in which one party takes a larger part of the pie than
the other (win-lose solutions). More empirical data are needed to learn more about how
employees and their supervisors negotiate their employment relation :  do supervisors
largely force their proposals upon employees, or do they come to win-win solutions in
which both organizational interests and individual interests are served ? Also, can one
speak of  negotiation in the strict  sense,  or  is  it  simply a  process  in which standard
solutions  are  slightly  adapted  without  realizing  the  potential  for  tailored  solutions
serving both organizational and individual interests ?
58 The third issue is on the distribution of value of individual negotiation : cui bono ? Quite a
few authors  point  to  the  drawbacks  of  individualised  employment  relationships.  For
instance, Sparrow & Cooper (2003) and Pfeffer (2001) point to the danger of individualised
employment relations being limited to the top 10 percent of the companies workforce.
These high potentials are encouraged to develop themselves, to get better rewards based
on performance, opportunities for mobility and so on. But the negative side of this ‘war
for talent’, is that the other 90 percent is neglected. In addition, concentration on the
individual  talents de-emphasises the need to pay attention to the organisation itself,
including technological, cultural and business processes that might have a bigger impact
on organisational performance than the efforts of single individuals. Beck (2000) argues
more  fundamentally  that  the  rebalance  from  collective  to  individual  employment
relations implies a shift in the balance of risk. The risks of employment become more
individualised.  On  top  of  that,  if  organisational  success  is  linked  more  and more  to
individual  efforts,  there is  risk that  organisational  failures are also attributed to the
failures of individuals. From our case studies it appears that respondents, regardless of
their role in the organization, perceive not only advantages, but disadvantages as well. 
 
Box 1 Overview of pros and cons of negotiating the employment relationship
Pros Cons
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More (pay) differentiation between high- and low-
performing employees is seen as both fairer, more
effective and more productive (management and
employees)
More possibilities to adjust work demands to
family needs (employees)
More freedom and responsibility and more
autonomously-thinking and acting and an increase
in work motivation (employees)
More opportunities for the company to stimulate
employees to craft their own job and manage their
own career, rather than following prescribed paths
(management) 
More opportunities for the company to increase
output through extended and more flexible
production hours (management)
More possibilities to recruit and retain employees
in a tight labour market. It stimulates loyalty and
commitment to the organization (management)
Unfair distribution of opportunities
(management and employees) 
Risk of chaos and loss of transparency
when everybody can make different deals
with their supervisor (management and
employees)
Discrepancies between staff levels and
workload, hampering operational
performance (management)
More stress and insecurity for employees
as employees have to take care for
themselves instead of their manager
(employees) 
Danger of quasi negotiations and
agreements (employees)
Likelihood that the employer will profit
more than the employee from increased
flexibility (employees)
Danger to team performance and team
spirit (management)
Increase in time spent on negotiation and
administrative fuss (management)
59 Advantages  perceived  by  the  different  stakeholders  are  that  negotiating  employee
relations  is  perceived  as  both  fair  and  effective,  leading  to  a  better  fit  between
organizational and individual interests, as well as to more proactive employees that show
extra-role behaviour (i.e. adding more value to the organization than is strictly asked for
within formal job descriptions, Schaubroeck & Fink, 1998 ;  Van Dyne & LePine, 1998).
Perceived  disadvantages  are  that  respondents  think  of  it  as  unfair,  because  tough
negotiators  rather  than  high  performers  will  take  the  most.  Indeed,  individually
negotiated employment relations put weak negotiators at a disadvantage. Moreover, it
may increase feelings of insecurity for some employees, putting them in employment
relations with constantly evolving expectations rather than a stable contract with stable
expectations which are based on the employer taking care of them. Furthermore, some
managers fear administrative fuzz, as well as agreements that go against organizational
interests.  Finally,  some  managers  believe  that  individual  negotiations  and  tailored
agreements  are  only  functional  for the company in  tight  labour  markets,  because  it
commits (certain) employees to the organization. 
60 What these perceptions of pros and cons of negotiating teach us, is that there may be an
optimum in the scope and practice of negotiating employment relations. No doubt that
several dilemmas are inherent to these kind of negotiations, for example, the ‘optimum’
choices for serving not only organizational and individual interests but also the interests
of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ employees alike. Up to a certain point, negotiating employment
relations is perceived as fair, serves everybody’s needs, is cost-effective and in line with
HR-goals such as having proactive employees that show extra-role behaviour. Above this
optimum point negotiations become unfair for some ‘weaker’ categories of employees
(such  as  low-educated  employees  in  low-level  jobs,  women,  disabled  and  foreign
employees, et cetera), serve the needs of the most powerful party only (which mostly is
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the employer, but sometimes also employees with a strong labour market position and
strong negotiating skills), are expensive in terms of administrative or other costs, and
lead to too much insecurity for large groups of employees. 
 
Conclusion
61 This  paper  generates  insights  into  (1)  the  possible issues  for  individually  negotiated
employment relations; (2) the actual use made by employees and supervisors of these
issues ; and (3) the degree of correspondence between scope and its actual use. Below we
summarize these insights and the directions for further research. 
62 Firstly, as an answer to our first question, we found that in at least two out of four cases,
considerable scope for negotiating employment relations exists. However, on some topics
there is more scope than on others. In the cases of Telecom and Insurance, considerable
scope  for  negotiating  additions  to  the  contract (e.g.  output  contract  or  contractual
changes in annual hours), for negotiating working hours (e.g. specific schedules, leave) and
for negotiating development (e.g. individual development plan) comes along with limited
scope for negotiating wages (e.g. wage increase) and performance goals (e.g. task content
and targets). We found in the Consultancy group that apart from contract there is scope
for  self-regulation,  not  negotiation,  of  working  hours, wages,  development  and
performance targets.
63 Secondly, we found that some topics are negotiated while other topics are not or only to a
limited degree. In the case of Telecom, Insurance and to a limited degree Metalworking,
we  found  that  employees  indeed  negotiated  working  hours with  their  supervisors.
Negotiation of  performance goals  was taking place only in Insurance and then only in
higher-level jobs in non-routine processes. In none of the cases individual negotiation
occurred on contract and wages. The cases differed with regard to development : this aspect
was negotiated in Telecom and to some extent in Metalworking, but not in Insurance. 
64 Thirdly, we found to a certain extent correspondence between scope and actual use of the
scope for negotiation, however not in every case. Apparently, employees and supervisors
did not use in every company the entire scope for individual negotiation.
65 Fourthly,  we  deduced  several  issues  for  further  research.  Given  the  diversity  of
individually negotiated employment relations, there is a need to know more about the
contingency-factors  that  influence  the  prevalence  and  effectiveness  of  individual
negotiation. Furthermore, opening the black box of the negotiation process itself is worth
in understanding the dynamics of individualized employment relations. More research is
also needed into the different negotiation styles and behaviours of both supervisors and
employees.  Especially the effects of integrative and distributive negotiation styles are
expected to have significantly different outcomes. Finally, the issue of the pro’s and con’s
of individual negotiation has been raised : who benefits from individual negotiation, and
how can we prevent negative side-effects ? We propose that an additional framework for
negotiation is needed in order to ensure an optimum between the different interests,
serving criteria such as : fairness (justice for all kinds of employees), balance (serving
both organizational  and individual  interests),  efficiency (benefits  outweigh costs)  and
security (job and income are to some extent guaranteed). 
66 It seems important for organizations to develop an optimum in the dilemmas we outlined
above. How much scope should collective agreements and management systems ideally
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create for negotiating employment relations ? To what extent is it possible to stimulate
employees and supervisors to use the scope ? On the basis of our explorative study, we do
not have the answers yet. Nevertheless, our data suggest some important criteria that
organizations can apply in order to assess the scope for negotiation and its use. These
criteria are :
• Fairness. Do employees perceive the interaction process and outcomes of negotiations as
fair ?
• Fit between organizational and individual interests. Do outcomes of negotiations serve both
organizational interests and individual interests of all employees, including ‘weaker’
employees ?
• Cost-effectiveness. Do savings (for instance a better fit between working hours and work load)
outweigh costs of negotiating ?
• Extra-role behaviour. Do negotiations stimulate extra-role behaviour of employees ? 
• Security. Do employees feel secure enough about keeping their job and maintaining their
income level ?
67 We  believe  that  taking  into  account  these  criteria  while  developing  the  arena  for
individually employment relations will benefit both employers and employees.
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ABSTRACTS
Our purpose is to assess the actual experiences of companies in the context of individualised
employment  relationships.  We  have  three  questions:  (1)  what  issues  of  the  employment
relationship  can  be  individually  negotiated  in  organizations?  (scope);  (2)  what  issues  of  the
employment relationship are individually negotiated in organizations? (actual use); (3) what are
the advantages and disadvantages of negotiations according to employees and managers?; We
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conducted  four  case  studies  in  Dutch  companies  in  different  sectors  (telecom,  insurance,
manufacturing  and  consultancy).  The  data  were  collected  in  a  total  of  69  semi-structured
interviews with line managers, HR managers and shop floor employees. We focused on five topics
of the employment relation: contract, working hours, wages, development and performance. We
found that the scope for negotiation differs according to topic: there is considerable scope with
regard to working hours, development and contract and little scope with regard to wages and
performance goals. However, employees and supervisors use the scope for negotiating only for
working hours and to a lesser extent development. On other topics negotiations hardly take place
(e.g.  contract)  or  only  under  specific  conditions  (e.g.  performance  goals  in  non-routine
processes). Furthermore, we found that employees and managers perceive both advantages and
disadvantages of negotiations. Considering the (dis) advantages our conclusion is that there must
be an optimum in the scope and use of negotiating the employment relationship in order to serve
conditions  as  fairness,  fit,  cost  effectiveness  and  extra-role  behaviour.Our  paper  provides
empirical  data  on  how  individualised  employment  relations  take  place  in  practice.  It  offers
insight in different companies on the scope for, the actual use of and the effects of individual
negotiations on different aspects of the employment relationship.
INDEX
Mots-clés: relations d’emploi individualisées, ententes collectives, négociation, études de cas
Keywords: individualised employment relationship, collective framework agreements,
negotiation, multiple case study
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